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Museum, Furniture, Men:  
The Queer Ecology of I Am My Own Wife1 
 
Queer Histories and Loved Objects 
I Am My Own Wife by Doug Wright stages the remarkable life of Charlotte von Mahlsdorf 
(born Lothar Berfelde in Berlin, 1928), a transvestite woman who lived through Nazi and 
Communist regimes, singlehandedly created a museum to house her collection of artefacts, 
and provided a safe haven within it for the lesbian and gay community of East Berlin. At the 
opening of the play we see Charlotte appear in a plain black dress through doors at the rear of 
the set; she pauses for a moment and then exits again. When she returns she is cradling a 
huge antique Edison phonograph and gives her audience a short lecture on its invention 
(Wright, Wife 9-11). For this, and all the other objects in her collection from the late 19th-
century (“Grunderzeit” era), we learn are her passion. The play stages Charlotte guiding 
visitors around her museum, introducing the collection: “Charlotte pulls a small, lovingly 
carved, elegantly furnished doll dresser from the box. She holds it sweetly in her palm and 
approaches the audience, holding it out for inspection.” (Wright, Wife 15) She has an old 
sideboard, a bust of Wilhelm II, a pendulum clock, an old gramophone, a cherry-pitter – all in 
miniature. The set is a “simple square room, […] a rear wall, covered in delicate blue-grey 
lace” (Wright, Wife 5). In the original 2003 New York production, designer Derek McLane 
gave a sense both of the density of von Mahlsdorf’s collection, and of its significance for 
history: 
 
Looming behind Charlotte’s modest quarters was a huge wall of shelving, overstuffed 
with antiquities: gilded mirrors, upturned chairs, ornate German cabinetry, porcelain 
dogs, sideboards, tea tables, music machines of all makes and varieties, old crystal 
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chandeliers, bureaus, bric-a-brac, and bronze busts—marvelous debris culled from the 
nineteenth century and hoarded with a kind of obsessive grandeur. […] The wall gave 
the play an epic scope; Charlotte’s repeated descriptions of furniture became—
through visual enhancement—a record of lives lived through the objects that were left 
behind. (Wright, Wife 6) 
 
The implication of Charlotte’s love for her objects is the central concern of this article.   
Wright’s play is not a straightforward chronicle of von Mahlsdorf’s life, but is rather 
the documentation of his attempt to write such a play, containing both verbatim elements, 
such as recordings of Wright’s interviews with von Mahlsdorf, and imagined scenarios. 
Wright appears as a character in his own play (known by his first name, Doug) – along with 
thirty-four other characters, all played by a single actor.2 Wright started the project with the 
desire to bring a queer historical icon to the New York stage but, while he was meeting with 
and writing about von Mahlsdorf, information came to light that complicated the project. This 
was to do with her supposed cooperation with East German authorities. On the face of it, it 
may seem that von Mahlsdorf’s transvestism, homosexuality and resistance to normative 
regimes of power are more than enough, in spite of her somewhat muddied past, to make her 
an important figure in a recovered homosexual history. However, as this article will explore, 
Wright found that his desire for von Mahlsdorf to be such a figure was ultimately 
unfulfillable.  
Before continuing, it may be worth noting that this article draws on two texts dealing 
with von Mahlsdorf’s life: Wright’s play, first performed off-Broadway at Playwrights 
Horizons, before transferring to the Broadway Lyceum theatre in 2003 and published in 
2004, and von Mahlsdorf’s autobiography, published in 1992.3 Many of the stories which von 
Mahlsdorf tells in her autobiography appear in similar detail in the interviews Wright uses in 
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his play, a fact which caused him some concern, especially when her Stasi file was unearthed. 
Doubts over the veracity of some of von Mahlsdorf’s stories were fortified by this almost 
verbatim telling and retelling of her life anecdotes. That said however, there are some 
remarkable moments of destabilizing queerness apparent within each text and the life to 
which they refer. These moments emerge most pointedly in revelations of von Mahlsdorf’s 
relationship with her collected objects. I approach each text therefore as a record or reference 
point for specific performances: one is Wright’s staging of Charlotte, and the other, von 
Mahlsdorf’s performance as museum curator and self-proclaimed bourgeois hausfrau.  
 The story of von Mahlsdorf’s realization of her transvestite identity is told both in 
her autobiography and in Wright’s play. She tells of her discovery of a copy of Magnus 
Hirschfeld’s book Die Transvestiten in her aunt’s house – an aunt who not only condones her 
behavior, but shares in the impulse. Her aunt catches her dressing in women’s clothing and 
says only (Charlotte translates into English): ‘Did you know that nature has dared to play a 
joke on us? You should’ve been born a girl and I should’ve been born a man!’ (Wright, Wife 
23). In terms of gendered identity then, von Mahlsdorf is keen to point out, and does so 
several times in her autobiography, that she feels in her soul as though she is a woman. She is 
not however, as she puts it, self-conscious of her biologically male body, adding that she is 
not a transsexual (von Mahlsdorf 43). Although she could never bear to grow a beard, the von 
Mahlsdorf that Wright meets in the 1990s does not attempt to hide the signs of her 
masculinity with cosmetics, nor has she ever given any thought to surgery. She writes of the 
great debt she owed to Magnus Hirschfeld whose books reassured her that she was not alone 
in the world and not to be condemned or imprisoned for being perverse or unnatural (133). 
Hirschfeld’s theory of sexual “intermediaries” suggests a vastly complex gender spectrum, 
with many and varied combinations in between the male-female polarity (Hirschfeld loc. 
3418 of 6275). Hirschfeld takes a far more tolerant and indeed progressive approach to 
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gender non-conformism, even making a case for the social and legal recognition of a person 
as their opposite gender as quite often ‘a question of existence’ (2296). Von Mahlsdorf’s 
transvestism needs to be set within the context of Hirschfeld’s language and understanding 
and set apart to a degree from fetishism (in the way that Hirschfeld defines this, drawing on 
Krafft-Ebing, 2345). What is most striking about von Mahlsdorf’s approach to her gender is 
the absence of internal conflict she displays when it comes to the disparity between her male 
physical body and her female ‘soul’, to use her own word; it is, to a contemporary eye, 
strikingly queer. 
 While von Mahlsdorf’s transvestitism may be therefore a clear starting point for an 
investigation which underscores her queerness and examines the fact that her living as a 
woman is inextricably linked to her resistance to regimes of power, I suggest that von 
Mahlsdorf’s relationship to objects, in combination with her non-normative approach to 
gender and sexuality, might provide a much more radical vision of her life, where the agency 
of matter, the forces it exerts over the human, becomes visible in and through her 
performance. Von Mahlsdorf may have failed to hold onto the social status she achieved 
before her Stasi file was released, but to dismiss her life’s work because of this would be a 
shame, as Wright well knew, and would mean failing to look deeper into the queer 
potentialities that she offers. In the following, I explore the extent to which von Mahlsdorf’s 
identities may be as fluid and unfixed as the anecdotes and narratives she creates for us. 
While recognizing that her actions may have been motivated by survival alone, this article 
attempts to explore what von Mahlsdorf’s performance may offer us, what critique of the 
structures of power, capital and normative relationality she allows us to imagine. The primary 
focus of the article is on what is at the center of von Mahlsdorf’s life and her desires: the 
objects of her collection, the things that were her life’s passion. Similarly to Wright, I take 
the approach that von Mahlsdorf’s life-narrative may not bring us to some ultimate truth 
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about her character, or her past actions. However, in her life and the version of it staged by 
Wright there are performative moments which may allow us to imagine queer alternatives to 
our current reality. In this article, I link queer understandings of gender and desire to 
emerging, radical interrogations of humanity’s place in the world, thus thinking of I Am My 
Own Wife (henceforth referred to as Wife) and the life of its protagonist through object-
oriented ontology and queer ecology. 
 
Charlotte’s Props? 
Theatre is an art form uniquely predisposed to revealing tensions and incoherencies in 
identity and is in the eyes of many inherently queer.4 Theatre tends also to be structured on 
the fault line between materiality and immateriality, demanding, as Bert States would have it, 
that we see it in all its concrete and phenomenological manifestations, as well as tune to its 
polysemic resonances (21). The prop in theatre is both a concrete object – matter in its own 
right – at the same time as it is meaningful within specific dramaturgies and narratives. As 
such, theatrical performance can reveal human-object relationality, contained in the 
relationship between the body and the prop on stage, and the prop and the meaningful real-
world objects for which it supposedly stands. While Andrew Sofer writes of the power of 
stage objects to take on a life of their own in performance (2), he maintains that a prop’s 
meaning is tied to an actor’s visible manipulation (24) and is therefore contingent on the 
human element. He writes that,   
 
like the play that contains it, then, the prop does not offer itself up to our gaze ‘all at 
once’ as a digestible sign. The prop must mean in the moment, and that meaning is 
inextricably tied to such contingent circumstances as the physical dimensions of the 
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performance space, the skill level of the individual actors, director, and designers, and 
the mood and makeup of the audience on a given night. (16) 
 
Sofer makes the case that the meaningfulness of the prop is given through its relationship 
with the other elements of theatre, including especially the human elements. The prop in 
itself, alone, is not enough to convey meaning. The prop is mute matter, awaiting activation. 
Props need human actors in order to speak, and audiences and actors need them to resonate 
with the narratives being presented. Not actors in themselves, props are owned by the actors 
(historically speaking, this was where the word theatrical “property” emerged from). In the 
following I consider Charlotte’s objects as props, yet I query ultimately if viewing her objects 
in this way may limit their vibrancy and agency.  
Charlotte’s miniaturized on-stage furniture pieces stand in naturalistically for the 
actual collection of objects in her museum, but gesture also to the theatricality inherent in von 
Mahlsdorf’s life: she is not only a museum guide, but an embodied re-enactment of the 
Grunderzeit era. Whether on stage or in her museum, these objects draw attention to the ways 
in which elements of the material world may stand in for something which is lost, be that 
something a time gone by or the material reality for which the stage itself stands. Charlotte’s 
objects are all clunky mechanical examples of a time of craftsmanship that predates the more 
streamlined and mass produced design practices of the mid-20th century. These material 
objects give the past a shape, a form, and a weight. They confer a degree of haptic certitude 
on the immaterial narratives of the past, just as they might be seen to anchor the queerly 
chimeric presence which moves among them, caring for them. Charlotte’s objects might 
therefore be usefully described as props, objects which allow her to realize her world and tell 
her story.  
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For example, when Charlotte talks of the Mulack-Ritze, the gay and lesbian bar that 
she “rescued” in 1963 from destruction by the communist government and housed, lovingly, 
in her basement, she speaks of the wood of the tables as “remembering” those who sat around 
them. She takes Doug on a tour and his response is one of wonderment:  
 
Holy shit. It’s huge. Old-fashioned, rough-hewn tables on wrought-iron stands. Cane-
back chairs. There is an enormous bar, made of oak, stocked high with glasses, 
liquorice, and—it’s porcelain, I can’t quite tell, but it might be an ancient beer pump. 
(Wright, Wife 37) 
 
Following this, the play re-enacts or re-imagines the ceremony in which she was awarded a 
Medal of Honor for her efforts of conservation. Charlotte talks of the famous figures that 
once frequented the bar – Bertolt Brecht, Marlene Dietrich, Magnus Hirschfeld, the actress 
Henny Porten.  For Charlotte, it is as if the traces of these people remain embedded in the 
surface of the material: “This table, he is over one hundred years old. If I could, I would take 
an old gramophone needle and run it along the surface of the wood. To hear the music of the 
voices. All that was said.” (Wright, Wife 38) The voices of the past are etched into the 
anthropomorphized wood of the table, to be awakened in Charlotte’s fantasy though material 
contact – needle and surface. She perceives the objects she describes to be imbued with 
presence, a plenitude of history etched therein: the world of matter (rough wood, porcelain, 
glass) becomes a repository for a record of human lives in a way which seems to confirm a 
certain hierarchy of inert matter and vibrant human subjectivity. And indeed it might be 
argued that Charlotte’s identity is somehow constructed out of the material objects with 
which she surrounds herself, that her objects and the clothes she wears are part of the 
construction of her classed, feminine identity; they are props for her performance. Wright’s 
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play illuminates the theatrical potential of Charlotte’s museum: she has constructed a set for 
her life. In concrete matter – wood, metal, simple fabric – she realises herself (and since her 
death in 2002, it might be added, leaves behind a museum, a material legacy).  
It might be said in that case that just as they “record” history, Charlotte’s objects form 
an important substrate for her chimeric identity – they are props (in the way that Sofer defines 
the term) for her complex traversal of gender, class, time and space continually enriched by 
material objects, just as the antique record sings when it is touched by the needle. It is a 
fascinating fact of this play that Jefferson Mays’s development of his performance as 
Charlotte involved drawing and cutting out miniatures of furniture and objects from her 
museum catalogue until he had a tiny paper “salon” in a shoebox, and then, during the 
workshop, gave a tour, as Charlotte, of the museum in miniature. This eventually became part 
of the show (Mays).  
Yet, even as Charlotte’s subjective identity spills over into the world, when needle 
touches wax and two surfaces are in friction, there is a vibrancy which may, in performance, 
surpass this limiting notion of identity, where the world is made into a theatre for the human 
performance of selfhood. These props may have a lively reality of their own also, even a 
certain agency. For instance, early in the play, Charlotte describes how she came to possess 
many of the items in her collection. She talks of how, under Hitler’s rule, she saved many 
records by Jewish composers from destruction and of how furniture came her way:  
 
When families died, I became the furniture. When the Jews were deported in the 
Second World War, I became it. When citizens were burned out of their homes by the 
Communists, I became it. After the coming of the wall, when the old mansion houses 
were destroyed to create the people’s architecture, I became it. (18)  
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While this might make von Mahlsdorf’s collecting activities seem quite mercenary and 
opportunist (and indeed Wright stages this critique among the barrage of questions thrown at 
Charlotte by journalists, (Wife 73)), it remains an act of cultural preservation, however 
ethically complicated, and one for which she was eventually honoured by the State. The 
choice of words is interesting here, however. In what is a beautiful illustration of the 
accidents of translation, she uses the word “become” to describe her relation to the objects, 
which is probably quite simply a direct translation of the German term bekommen, which 
means “to get”. Yet this simple error of speech, which employs a false cognate between 
English and German, renders her relationship with her objects as being far more intimate than 
perhaps she intended – it describes Charlotte’s intimate ethics of curation most fittingly, and 
renders visible the vibrancy of the objects themselves.  
Although Douglas Mao is cautious about making sweeping claims for historical 
narratives, he suggests that one of the significant epistemic ruptures of our time “is to be 
found in a new return to objects, now held to illuminate not only the order of the cosmos or 
distant antiquity but also the immediate human past (and even, in flashes, the dark chasms of 
the near human future)” (6). While the newness of the “turn” to objects may be debatable, 
this rupture is lived out in recent philosophical shifts towards a radical re-thinking of being – 
a re-thinking which attempts to push philosophical enquiry beyond the limits of human 
epistemological structures and toward the world in-itself. Among the vanguard of this branch 
of philosophical enquiry, which has become known as speculative realism, is the writing of 
Quentin Meillassoux. Meillassoux claims that the central notion of modern philosophy since 
Kant is that of correlation, in other words the idea that there is always correlation between 
thinking and being, and that the two can never be considered apart; the idea that the world 
discloses itself “through me” has come to dominate Western thought (5-6). Correlationism 
insists on the one hand on a connection to radical exteriority – being toward the world (as in 
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the philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre) while on the other hand insisting on a sense of perceptual 
(and therefore mental) imprisonment: exteriority is consequently only a correlate of our own 
existence (7). For Meillassoux, 
 
contemporary philosophers have lost the great outdoors, the absolute outside of pre-
critical thinkers: that outside which was not relative to us, and which was given as 
indifferent to its own givenness to be what it is, existing in itself regardless of whether 
we are thinking of it or no; that outside which thought could explore with the 
legitimate feeling of being on foreign territory—of being entirely elsewhere (7). 
 
Other thinkers such as Graham Harman and Jane Bennett have taken these ideas in a 
direction which is even more radically attuned to the world in-itself, specifically the world of 
objects. Harman writes that “Contrary to the dominant assumption of philosophy since Kant, 
the true chasm in ontology lies not between humans and the world, but between objects and 
relations” (2). He draws on Heidegger whom he argues accidentally incites a new age of 
metaphysics, providing a position for an object oriented ontology to “oppose the dictatorship 
of human beings in philosophy”: 
 
What emerges in its place is a ghostly cosmos in which humans, dogs, oak trees, and 
tobacco are on precisely the same footing as glass bottles, pitchforks, windmills, ice 
cubes, magnets, and atoms. Instead of exiling objects to the natural sciences (with the 
usual mixed emotions of condescension and fear), philosophy must reawaken its lost 
talent for unleashing the enfolded forces trapped in the things themselves. (2) 
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Jane Bennett similarly highlights what is typically cast in the shadow: the material agency or 
effectivity of nonhuman or not-quite-human things (Loc. 36 of 2417). She aims to paint a 
positive ontology of vibrant matter, which stretches received notions of agency and freedom, 
dissipating the onto-theological binaries of life/matter, human/animal, will/determination, and 
organic/inorganic and sketching a style of political analysis that can better account for the 
contributions of nonhuman actants (48). The “vital materialism” that Bennett proposes shares 
with these other writers an attempt at a radical displacement of the human subject (558).  
While on-stage props may function literally as props for character and narrative, there 
is something in Charlotte’s approach to objects which demand that we think of them beyond 
the human significances ascribed to them; the hint at this radical understanding of selfhood, 
vis-á-vis objects, is fascinating. As well as this embodied connection to her objects, her anti-
instrumentalist care for them means that she loves things that are obsolete and redundant. Of 
the era of design which she is most fond of, she says:  
 
And the trim? People would tear it off; they would burn it. They did not like the 
scalloped wood, the tiny turrets, the ornamental molding. ‘Too old-fashioned! Too 
difficult to dust!’ But me . . . I had a feeling for such things. And so I saved it 
(Wright, Wife 16).  
 
This is reflected in in her autobiography. She recounts how when five or six years old she 
preferred to play with old junk rather than real toys. Sometimes she would play with doll 
furniture given to her by her mother or a train set given to her by her great-uncle; however 
her true interests however lay in cleaning and admiring her great-uncle’s old clocks, kerosene 
lamps, paintings, and candlesticks and with collecting a “useless hodge-podge” as her uncle 
called it (von Mahlsdorf 17-18). She also presents herself and is presented by Wright as a 
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deeply humble figure who has no desire to make money, but merely survives, frugally, on a 
small pension and whatever donations the visitors to the museum choose to give (von 
Mahsldorf 183). What is worth noting are the sacrifices that Charlotte has made for her 
objects, the ways in which she took care of them, the hours of labor she poured into cleaning 
and preservation and the place they hold in the self-defined hierarchy of her life: “Museum. 
Furniture. Men.” (Wright, Wife 67), as she put it herself.  
Reading Charlotte’s object oriented existence in this way has implications for how we 
understand the hetero-patriarchal and capitalist systems which places the consuming human 
at the top of the hierarchal pyramid and mute matter at the bottom. Von Mahlsdorf’s form of 
what might be termed queer ecology hints at a disruption of this hierarchy. She generates a 
vision of a “flat ontology” which, in Levi Bryant’s characterization, suggests that humans 
may not be at the center of being, but are among beings. As Bryant puts it, “Humans, far from 
constituting a category called ‘subject’ that is opposed to ‘object’, are themselves one type of 
object among many,” (249). In the work of Jane Bennett, “flat ontology” indicates the 
elevation of all things to a non-hierarchical mode of existence.  
When Doug says to his friend John: “Don’t you see? She doesn’t run a museum, she 
is one! The rarest artifact she has isn’t a grandfather clock or Biedermeyer tallboy. It’s her” 
(Wright, Wife 36), he intends to convey the extent to which Charlotte embodies a queer 
history he never knew existed. Yet, in light of the ways in which Charlotte relates to her 
objects, “becoming” them, as she puts it, albeit unintentionally placing her alongside her 
collection in a way which, on the one hand may objectify her into becoming a totem of 
recovered history and, on the other, provide a glimpse into a more radical and queer human-
object relationship, in line with the philosophical approach of object-oriented ontology. When 
it comes to von Mahlsdorf’s past, her cooperation with the Stasi and the colorful tales she 
wove, such a position is not unproblematic however.  
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Ethics in an Object-Oriented World  
Von Mahlsdorf’s object orientation presents an ethical problem. For if Wright found it 
difficult to generate a queer icon given Charlotte’s past, then uncovering a queer human-
object relationality with a whiff of the utopic about it should be no easier. The question of 
whether or not the play (and indeed von Mahlsdorf’s presentation of herself) points to how a 
love of object is paralleled with or connected to a lack of concern for fellow humans – an 
ethical failing in other words – needs to be addressed in full before any conclusions can be 
drawn about what von Mahlsdorf’s object-oriented performance might represent. While 
mostly positive, many critical responses to the play during its US premiere and later UK tour 
voiced suspicions that Wright left too much of his subject uninterred. London reviewers in 
particular critiqued the show for not going far enough below the surface that von Mahlsdorf 
presented to the world. For example, Guardian newspaper critic Michael Billington accused 
Wright of buying into Charlotte’s carefully constructed surface identity. If Charlotte is a 
living museum, Billington longs to know how she appears “after closing time”. His 
comments, that a regime collaborator cannot be said to have truly “survived” (at least not 
innocently) are perhaps overly harsh given what is evident about the complexity of life in 
Communist East Germany and Billington admits as much, but the questions that he asks 
(which Wright’s play does not) are appropriately searching:  
 
Wright not only seems in thrall to his subject, he also never investigates the reality of 
her life. How difficult was it to live as a transvestite in a rigidly puritanical East 
Berlin? How did she finance her museum? And, although Charlotte turned her 
carefully preserved bar into a sexual meeting-house, was she herself devoid of 
emotional entanglements? By accepting Charlotte's version of herself, Wright turns 
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her into a gay icon: what he fails to do is penetrate behind the mask. (Billington 2005: 
42)5  
 
To be fair, some of these questions, such as the lengths that she goes to save and occupy the 
old mansion that now houses her museum, are addressed (even if doubts remain) in 
Charlotte’s autobiography. And, while I address below the state of her emotional 
entanglements, it is important to note that that we cannot be fully sure that her collaboration 
was the ethical failing Billington suspects. In a right-of-reply piece published by the 
Guardian newspaper, Wright counters Billington’s analysis by suggesting that the critic has 
missed the central point. The play is not a character study, but uses von Mahlsdorf’s life story 
to explore thematic questions about the nature of history, such as what persons merit 
inclusion in the historical record? And: when is history marred by self-invention and 
mythology? He argues that:  
 
The accusation that I treat Charlotte's connections with the Stasi lightly is salacious. 
My reaction to her involvement mirrored that of the German people: initial outrage, 
which abated when the extent of the phenomenon became clear. That is, one in three 
Germans were working for the Stasi. The play doesn't accept Charlotte's own 
mythology as truth but challenges the veracity of the facts. To leave her mystery 
intact is not a liability of the piece, but its greatest asset. Audiences can reach their 
own judgments. (“Right of reply”) 
 
As for being “in thrall” to von Mahlsdorf, it was Wright himself who was able to facilitate 
her access to her Stasi file and this ultimately became an important part of the play. As a 
foreign researcher he could expedite the process of negotiating an overloaded bureaucracy 
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and did so with the proviso that he would be allowed to read it too. In an interview he 
describes the moment Charlotte read the file:  
 
She was surprisingly cavalier about its disclosures; she had either an amusing 
anecdote or staunch defense for each of its allegations. She was titillated when she 
read it, and even giggled on occasion. Apparently, she gave a few of those Stasi 
officers a real run for their money. (Stanescu 102) 
 
Before the discovery of the file, Jens Giersdorf points out that she was an exotic and 
authentic queer icon fit for presentation on the North American stage (185). This is expressed 
early on in Wright’s play: after the initial set of interviews, Doug writes to Charlotte, sending 
her two antique cylinders, saying that he is listening to the interview tapes at every chance he 
gets and expresses his fascination with her life story. He tells her “You are teaching me a 
history I never knew I had. Thank you.” (Wright 28) Michael R. Schiavi points out that this is 
understandable: “In an era marked by violence and absence, queer descendants seek the few 
vocal ancestors who can provide a community history that Wright, a gay native of the Texas 
Bible belt coveted upon meeting Charlotte.” (201) Wright even pokes fun at his own 
enthusiasm for the project. In his request for permission to write a play about Charlotte’s life, 
Doug reveals her cultural value: “As far as grant applications go—forgive me—but from 
where I sit, you’re a slam dunk.” (19) Wright admits to wanting von Mahsldorf to function as 
an icon of queer survival and history, but this aim is acknowledged as ultimately very 
problematic.  
Act I of the play ends with the revelations of the Stasi file, and in Act II we are 
introduced to Alfred Kirschner, whom Charlotte is accused of informing upon to save herself 
and her collection. Their relationship began and was rooted in their mutual love of beautiful 
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objects. Charlotte recounts how one rainy day in Berlin she ducked into an antique shop and 
met Alfred for the first time. They both realized that they shared a passion for collecting, and 
Alfred invited Charlotte to his apartment to see his record collection – of which he claimed to 
have about 15,000. In the play, Charlotte lists his expansive collection not only of records, 
but also of pianolas, clocks, and even a mediaeval breastplate (von Mahsldorf 51-52). In 
Charlotte’s version of events, Alfred persuaded her to renounce him when the Stasi 
investigated their underground business. The Stasi impounded all of Alfred’s collection and, 
so broken was he by this that he ceased collecting after his release from prison. When he 
died, Charlotte found that he had left everything to her. The stage directions invoke a linkage 
between corporeal body and material object: 
 
(She picks ALFRED’s glasses up off the sideboard and contemplates them a final 
time.) 
 
   Alfred was more intelligent than I. 
 
(She slides open a drawer and—delicately—places the glasses inside, shutting it 
gently. A burial.) 
 
   Still, that’s all he had left – scraps of paper, yes? (61) 
 
 
When Doug confronts her with his doubts, her only response she has is to show him the 
sweater which she knitted for Alfred while he was in prison. Frequently, the play documents 
how, when experiencing pain or regret and the pressure of negative opinion or critique, 
Charlotte turns to her objects, instead of providing explanations. In this case the turn to the 
object is not necessarily innocent, but tied here to her potential deception, a deception of 
herself also perhaps. The next three scenes (“The Cross”, “The Three M’s”, “Celebrity”) 
address the publicity over Charlotte’s Stasi file. Charlotte’s only reply to her detractors is to 
give the order in which she lived her life: “Museum. Furniture. Men.” (Wright, Wife 67). In 
her autobiography, she tells also an anecdote in which she chooses to keep an appointment 
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with a clockmaker over the temptation of sex (Wright, Wife 67), serving to reinforce the 
priority that Charlotte gives to the objects in her life. If she makes any concession to the truth 
it is expressed in the following passage in the play, after Doug questions her about the file:   
 
 (Another pause. Charlotte turns cagey) 
 
Meine Tante Luise always said, ‘Be as smart as the snakes; it’s in the Bible.’ She 
said, ‘Never forget that you are living in the lion’s den. Sometimes you must 
howl with the wolves.’ (Wright, Wife 44)  
 
During the course of the play, Doug expresses his frustration with the attempt to write a play 
about von Mahlsdorf, a process made even more difficult by her Stasi record. He 
acknowledges that he needs to believe in those stories as much as von Mahlsdorf does, yet 
the play images Charlotte taking refuge in her queer status against an onslaught of 
international journalists who have dug deeply into her past. Her only reply to them is to 
recount the story of her mother asking, evasively, “‘Lottchen, it’s all very well to play dress-
up. But now you’ve grown into a man. When will you marry?’” To which she replies: 
“‘Never, my dear Mutti. Ich bin meine eigene Frau. I am my own wife.’” (Wright, Wife 75) 
Wright’s solution to the problem – the desire for a queer icon, and evidence of queer history 
meeting certain historical realities – is to present Charlotte as she presents the objects in her 
museum: 
 
DOUG: Charlotte, what do you do when a piece loses its luster? Are you ever 
attempted to strip the wood or replace the veneer? 
CHARLOTTE: I did not refinish the pieces. No. Diese alte Anrichte? The polish is as 
old as the object itself. It is antique, too. 
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[ . . . ] 
A missing balustrade, a broken spindle. These things, they are proof of its history. 
And so you must leave it. (77-8) 
 
She points out that she would never throw anything away even if old and damaged: “It is a 
record, yes? Of living. Of lives.” (78) It is worth noting that while von Mahlsdorf may not 
provide the material necessary for recovered, ennobled queer history, the work that she did in 
maintaining a safe social space for lesbian, gay and trans people during years before the fall 
of the Iron Curtain cannot be underestimated and only adds to the complexity of her story.  
Furthermore, Wright, leaving conclusions about von Mahlsdorf deliberately undrawn, is 
aware of the kind of narrative that would be needed to make von Mahlsdorf into a queer 
historical icon – such an approach would have to be deeply selective about her life and, as 
Judith Halberstam puts it, find it necessary to engage in the disciplinary process of 
memorialization, where a ‘continuous narrative replaces one full of ruptures and 
contradictions’ (Loc. 245 of 2706). Better perhaps, as Halberstam would have it, to fail and 
leave open those ruptures and contradictions.  
In Germany, the discovery of the file meant von Mahlsdorf was exposed to a great 
deal of public criticism. Giersdorf writes that, with the suggestion that she had operated as an 
informer, von Mahlsdorf lost a great deal of respect, even though it may have been her 
collaboration, willing or otherwise, that enabled her survival and that of her museum. The 
Stasi question is of course a deeply complex one and, as Wright pointed out in his reply to 
Billington, a significant number of the East German populace “cooperated”, whether 
willingly or not. While Giersdorf’s piece on the play usefully sets von Mahlsdorf within the 
context of lesbian and gay history in East Germany (something which Wright recognizes as 
beyond his capability to display in all its complexity), Giersdorf also draws a very helpful 
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distinction between Wright’s and von Mahlsdorf’s ‘inventions’. While neither Wright, Rosa 
von Praunheim (who made a documentary about von Mahlsdorf6), nor von Mahlsdorf herself, 
can stake a firm claim on truth, they invent for very different reasons. Von Praunheim 
“emphasized the gap between all the layers of her existence” in ‘a political celebration of von 
Mahlsdorf as a powerful alternative to mainstream standards of sexuality and gender 
(Giersdorf 187). Furthermore, Giersdorf also suggests that Wright eliminates Charlotte’s 
sexuality in the play, when in fact she led a very active sex life, even if she rather 
coquettishly recounts choosing furniture over men. Wright does this by both exoticisizing her 
and by removing her sexuality from the public theatrical display (187). Wright’s intention 
was to “present a theatrical event about a compelling character”:  
 
[T]hey were inventions for very different reasons. Wright aimed toward the theatrical 
representation; von Mahlsdorf had to survive. Thus Wright had to take liberties and 
simplify where von Mahlsdorf had to avoid generalizations. The real-life von 
Mahlsdorf performed ambivalence and contradiction. (Giersdorf 189) 
 
In his analysis, Giersdorf presents the ambivalence and contradiction which von Mahlsdorf 
embodies as a survival strategy. Her survival includes also the survival of her objects, her 
museum.  
It is necessary therefore to consider the ethics of von Mahlsdorf’s love of objects: 
does it come at the cost of the lives and sufferings of others?  Firstly, it’s not entirely clear 
how von Mahlsdorf’s past is to be characterized: as the ethically ambiguous actions of a self-
interested survivalist or the actions of someone who, as a member of a homosexual minority, 
has always risked persecution on the margins of society? Even as she hovers, chimerically, 
out of the range of truth and authentication, I find it difficult to read von Mahlsdorf as a self-
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interested survivalist alone. She does not represent a full rejection of humanity (as I explore 
further below) and, if her priorities are focused on her objects, it has to be remembered that it 
was among and with objects that she found friendship and happiness, within, let us not forget, 
a society that for the most part rejected her. Von Mahlsdorf’s life, emerging in her 
autobiography and in Wright’s play, may indeed reveal the muddied and complex 
compromises that the most marginal in society must make in order to survive.  
Yet the suggestion that she has a greater loyalty to inanimate objects than to her 
fellow humans is significant when it comes to the complex ethics of a queer ecology; the 
place of the human within such an object-oriented world is worth considering. By taking 
account of von Mahlsdorf’s relationship with objects along with the queer potentialities of 
her gender dysphoria, an image is laid bare of the queerness of that relationality. Von 
Mahlsdorf does not provide a model for a utopian homosexual community; her past, like the 
antique pieces she protects, is missing too much of its veneer. Her curatorial practice might 
be better viewed as ecological rather than humanitarian.  And her museum, I suggest, models 
a kind of queer ecology which points more toward the unfathomable intimacies between 
manifestations of matter than those between human and human. To imagine these is, as 
Timothy Morton points out, “to imagine pleasures that are not heteronormative, not genital, 
not geared to ideologies about where the body stops and starts” (280), and perhaps not 
ethical, at least from a humanist perspective, and certainly not innocent.  
A human lack of concern for the impact of the matter it produces, consumes and 
throws away, from plastics to carbon, will most likely determine the course of humanity 
within the next fifty to one hundred years. Yet matter, from carbon and plastics to bacteria, 
viruses and so forth, will not mourn our passing nor share in our suffering. The material 
world does not share in a humanist system of ethics, utilitarian, deontological or otherwise, 
but is its indifference to human suffering the same indifference that von Mahlsdorf showed? 
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Does she align herself with the mute, indifferent world of objects to such a degree that her 
actions represent a failure of interpersonal ethics, covered over by her carefully woven 
narratives? And, furthermore, is it highly problematic that I should name this action as 
‘queer’, thus perhaps aligning von Mahlsdorf with the anti-humanist queer sentiments of Lee 
Edelman and Leo Bersani? Furthermore, it is perhaps a mistake to call such a life queer when 
it might in fact be characterized by nothing more than self-interest. My final commentary will 
be concerned therefore with whether or not the displacement of the human in Wife is also a 
rejection of the human and will address the extent to which we can move beyond 
pathologizing von Mahlsdorf’s actions toward thinking through the implications, ethical and 
otherwise, of her answer to the call of objects.  
 
Beyond the Human 
With the embodied connection with objects in Wife comes a simultaneous, though not 
necessarily innocent, displacement of the human, realized through the ways that Charlotte (in 
Wright’s dramatization) directs her audience’s attention. She draws attention first and 
foremost to the object itself, secondarily to its affective qualities, and only lastly to the human 
histories it embodies. As previously noted, the play begins with Charlotte introducing the 
phonograph. She describes the workings of the object in detail, turning the handle and 
readying it for play as she does so, before remarking on how the needle with its little sapphire 
“sounds so nice” when it grazes the record. We hear the sounds of an old German waltz, 
described by Wright in the directions as “scratchy and exquisite” (Wright, Wife 11); as the 
record plays, Charlotte reminisces on how she played British and American records while 
allied aeroplanes flew over Mahlsdorf, thinking that if they can hear her playing Edison 
records they will know she is a friend. In these brief opening moments of the play, we are 
given an insight into Charlotte’s world of objects. Even though the object is linked to two 
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historical moments (the late 19th century when it was created and the Second World War), 
and ultimately conceived as a bearer of history, there is still a moment when the object exists 
on stage briefly before being required to bear the weight of history. This privileging of the 
object, beyond its historical meanings, may gesture toward the object as thing, or, in Bryant’s 
terms a ‘subjectless object’, an object in-itself (19). If the meaning of the object is always 
fundamentally linked to the determination of the subject, things, in Bennett’s words are those 
“vivid entities not entirely reducible to the contexts in which (human) subjects set them, 
never entirely exhausted by their semiotics” (235). It may be that Charlotte’s performances 
offer us a glimpse into the world of matter, with matter even shown to exert agency, degrees 
of force over the human subject.  
Bennett proposes that we think of the agency of things, a sort of thing-power, where 
supposedly inanimate matter exerts force over humans, compelling action. Regarding the 
practice of hoarding, she suggests that if we bypass for a moment the impulse to pathologize 
the hoarder (and exoticize and exploit also, as is the case with so many television shows on 
the subject), the hoarder might present as having great sensitivity to matter’s vibrancy and 
reveal, as she puts it, the “strange attraction”, even power, that objects exert over humans. 
Hoarding, Bennett suggests, is one end of a spectrum, with the collector (of Walter 
Benjamin’s commentary) at the other (Bennett, 2010). Von Mahlsdorf might well be placed 
somewhere on this spectrum; her collecting is obsessive, but her “hoard” is deeply ordered; 
she approaches her collection in a non-instrumentalist manner, and takes great pleasure in 
their form (scratches and all) – unlike, it might be added, the more extreme hoarder, where 
pleasure taken in individual objects becomes limited, as they are swallowed by vast amounts 
of hoarded matter. On the whole however, von Mahlsdorf seems to answer the call of the 
object more fully than that of the human.    
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In this privileging of objects, Charlotte may point toward a radical thinking beyond 
the human, a post-or non-anthropocentric vision of the world. The re-routing of desire, not 
only away from normative reproductive (heterosexual) relationality, but also from human to 
human relationality is what makes Charlotte’s case both radical and unique. That is not to 
say, however, that human love and sex is excluded. In her autobiography von Mahlsdorf is 
candid and unembarrassed about her desire for men. Indeed, one of the criticisms levelled at 
Wright’s rendering of Charlotte has to do with the play’s downplaying of von Mahlsdorf’s 
quite active sex life. Giersdorf suggests that Wright eliminates her sexuality in the play by 
both exoticizing her and by removing her sexuality from public theatrical display into the 
private realm of the audience’s imagination (187). It might be noted also that von 
Praunheim’s documentary deals much more openly with von Mahlsdorf’s sexuality, 
including her interest in sadomasochism. Certainly von Mahlsdorf does not herself shy away 
from or disavow her own desires, nor does she condemn the desires of others. This is lived 
out in the anecdotes she tells in her autobiography of sexual encounters and longer romances, 
as well as the fact that when she preserved the Mulack-Ritze bar she not only gave members 
of the lesbian, gay and transgender community a safe social space, but also provided private 
space for people to have sex: “It was a museum for all people, but I thought, Why not for 
homosexuals?” (Wright 38) Yet, at the same time, she clearly loves to tell of how her desires 
are somewhat torn, between beautiful men and beautiful objects. The objects tend to win the 
battle with great frequency: “If I were to get a new Vertikow cabinet today, ten willing man 
could do cartwheels on my steps and I would send them home” (von Mahlsdorf 179). She 
demonstrates love and care for the material objects she preserves and this is expressed in the 
very loving, tactile relationship between the staged body in Wife and the objects that she 
holds.  
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She recounts also how the formation of important human to human relationships was 
facilitated by her love of objects. Just emerging into teenage-hood, she found acceptance and 
tolerance in the second-hand shop run by Max Bier, a place where she could be herself; the 
Biers called her by the feminine name Lottchen (von Mahlsdorf 28). Similarly, she presents 
her relationship with Kirschner as, while not sexual (although Kirschner was gay), both 
deeply accepting of von Mahlsdorf’s nature and connected to their mutual love of antiques. 
So, while von Mahlsdorf does not appear to have had difficulty forming relationships or 
finding acceptance, it might be suggested that those relationships were related to, even rooted 
in, material culture and a shared love of objects.  
It must be emphasized then that in spite of the complexity of von Mahlsdorf’s 
relationships with her fellow humans, she does not reject humanity, but rather opens a space 
to see relationality differently. Although selective about the sorts of objects she collects, von 
Mahlsdorf may image something of the true materialism of which Morton writes, a queer 
ecology which shows how beings exist “precisely because they are nothing but relationality, 
deep down—for the love of matter” (277). Charlotte’s performances, by which I mean her 
daily performance as museum curator and its embodiment in the play, hint at the beyond of 
the correlation between self and world and enact a post-anthropocentric vision of the world in 
which bodies and objects share both space and materiality, in a sort of “flat ontology” in 
which there is no hierarchy of being and the human is an object among objects (22). In her 
love of objects, and her sensitive curatorial relationality with them, Charlotte is not only 
transgender, but also traverses the boundary between human and object. If there is a link 
between the destabilization of gender in the performances of Charlotte von Mahlsdorf and the 
destabilization of the pre-eminence of the human in the world, it is here in the gesture 
through which she places herself within the realm of objects. It might be argued of course 
that the museum is an extension of von Mahlsdorf’s subjectivity, providing a mise en scène 
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for her sense of identity and that when she “became” the object she merely extended and 
articulated herself. It might be argued also, as discussed above, that the museum and its 
objects signal von Mahlsdorf’s failure to live up to the ideals which Wright (and indeed post-
Communist German society) set for her, as well as a way of covering over that failure. Yet 
the ways in which, in her stories, she makes herself diminutive, humble before her objects, 
indicates a way of thinking beyond selfhood, at least in the ways that we currently imagine 
selfhood. In her embrace of the vibrancy of objects and her sensitivity to their affective 
qualities (the sapphire needle on the antique cylinder) she models a different kind of ecology. 
She even gives us a moment, in the midst of all her flaws (perhaps because of them), to 
imagine what a queer ecology, in which the anthropocentric hierarchy of human, animal, 
object is disrupted, might look like. Even as she fails as the queer icon that Wright longed for, 
her performance demands that we think about the complex ways in which human existence is 
implicated in the material world. Living her life in the order of museum, furniture men, she 
reminds us that we cannot consider humanity in full without thinking also of how human life 
is interwoven and ethically implicated in the vibrant lives of our inhuman others.   
 
 
 Notes 
1 I am very grateful to Dirk Schubotz of Queen’s University Belfast for his advice and insight on an early draft 
of this article.  
2 She was played by Jefferson Mays in the New York premiere production in 2003 (dir. Moisés Kaufman) and 
by John Cronin in a more recent production in Belfast, Northern Ireland (Prime Cut Theatre Company, directed 
by Emma Jordan, September 2012), a performance which this writer attended.  
3 Note that I use “Charlotte” to indicate the character in Wright’s play and “von Mahlsdorf” when discussing 
von Mahlsdorf in the context of her autobiographical material.  
4 As Jill Dolan puts it, “With its liminal status as both real and not, as ephemeral and transformational, theatre 
has long been a site where misfits and the marginalized have congregated. Sexual minorities have found among 
theatre people a generous acceptance sometimes not available dominant culture’s work constrained, conforming 
ways of life” (3).   
5 Similarly, Nicholas De Jongh, for example, writes that ‘Disappointingly, Wright avoids psychological probing 
and relentlessly skims the flamboyant surface of a life’ and Benedict Nightingale writing in The Times asks if 
Wright could not have explored Charlotte in greater depth. This is not limited to UK critics alone although 
critics in the US tended to be somewhat more sympathetic to the difficulties of presenting a subject like 
Charlotte. See for example Murray (2003) and Weber (2004).  
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6 The documentary, made in 1992, is entitled I Am My Own Woman.  
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